Competition is more intense than three years ago, in-depth | Iran's presidential election is approaching: polls show a three-way tie
40 days after Iranian President Raisi was killed in a plane crash, Iran will hold a new presidential election on June 28.
Iranian public opinion said that compared with the last presidential election three years ago, the competition this time is more intense, and no candidate has taken the lead. However, judging from the past four Iranian presidents, the ambiguity of the election seems to be the norm. Three of them were unexpectedly elected and were not generally favored during the campaign.
How will the vote go in two days? Who will win the presidency in Iran, where conservatives currently dominate the political arena?
Earlier this month, Iran's Guardian Council approved six candidates for the presidential election. Five of them are from the conservative camp, namely Parliament Speaker Qalibaf, Vice President Hashemi, Tehran Mayor Zakhani, former nuclear negotiator Jalili and former Interior Minister Pour-Mohammadi; only one belongs to the reform camp - independent politician and former Health Minister Pezeshkian.
As the voting day approaches, most official and unofficial Iranian online polls show that this election will present a three-way race, with current Speaker of Parliament Khalibaf and former nuclear negotiator Jalili leading the race, followed closely by former Health Minister Pezeshkian, but the gap in support rates between them is only in single digits.
Qalibaf, 62, has served as commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, director of the National Police, mayor of Tehran and other important positions. He is an ally of Supreme Leader Khamenei and has close ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard. He has run for president twice but failed. He is regarded as a pragmatic conservative who advocates using negotiations as a weapon to exchange actions for actions to get the West to lift sanctions.
Jalili, 58, holds a doctorate in political science and calls himself a devout believer in Iran's "supreme rule of law." He was crippled in the Iran-Iraq War, served in Khamenei's office for four years, and failed in his bid for the presidency in 2013. He is regarded as a hard-line diplomat who opposes "confession diplomacy" and refuses to compromise with the West.
Pezeshkian, 69, is an Azerbaijani MP, a little-known politician and heart surgeon, and the only reformist candidate approved by the Guardian Council. He served as Minister of Health in the reformist government from 2001 to 2005 and is seen as the successor to the political legacy of former reformist President Rouhani, advocating negotiations with the West to lift sanctions.
"Generally speaking, Qalibaf is the more popular candidate among the three candidates, and Jalili may be the one who can strictly implement the intentions of the supreme leader. However, the three have not opened up a gap, and no one has shown a particularly outstanding advantage." Qin Tian, deputy director and researcher of the Institute of Middle East Studies of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, pointed out that compared with the last presidential election, no one can be supported by the supreme leader Khamenei all the way like Raihi and maintain a strong personal relationship with Khamenei. After Raihi's death, Iranian politics lacks a particularly heavyweight figure. From this perspective, this election will be more competitive.
"The six candidates in this election have sharply contrasting political factions, reflecting the expectations of the Iranian power core about the president's faction." Liu Zhongmin, professor at the Institute of Middle East Studies of Shanghai International Studies University and vice president of the Chinese Society of Middle East Studies, pointed out that since the mid-to-late 1990s, Iranian politics has generally shown a "pendulum" effect. Conservative and reformist/moderate presidents take turns to take office, and each cycle is basically 8 years. Since conservative President Rahi came to power in 2021, Iran has entered a conservative political cycle. Although it was interrupted by Rahi's death, it did not affect the overall trend. However, this does not mean that reformist candidates have no chance at all.
Qin Tian noticed that Pezeshkian is not a prominent figure of the reformists, does not have a bright reformist label, and his policy propositions are not radical. "It can be said that he is a relatively conservative, moderate, and low-key reformist technocrat. The fact that the Guardian Council of Iran included him in the candidate list shows that for the Iranian regime and the policy framework of the Islamic Republic, which are controlled by conservatives, he is a relatively safe and reliable candidate like other candidates."
According to Iranian law, in the presidential election, the candidate who obtains more than 50% of the votes wins directly; if no candidate obtains more than 50% of the votes, the two candidates with the most votes will enter a second round.
This rule gives some reformists hope. They believe that since there is only one reformist candidate, votes will be more concentrated in the first round of voting, and the chances of entering the second round of voting will be greater. By then, the mood of reformist voters will be greatly boosted, and the "swing" voters will be reshuffled, so the reformists have a chance of winning.
The two analysts pointed out that as the voting day approaches, the election situation may still undergo subtle changes, and there are two directions worth observing: candidates and voter turnout.
Let's look at the candidates first. "According to convention, it is not uncommon for presidential candidates to withdraw midway. This time, it is also not ruled out that some conservative candidates will withdraw at the last minute so that the votes can be more concentrated on popular figures," said Liu Zhongmin.
"A big suspense is whether one of the two leading conservative candidates, Qalibaf and Jalili, will withdraw." Qin Tian believes that if one of them withdraws, it will greatly increase the possibility of the other winning directly. If both run at the same time, it is likely to lead to a second round of voting. At that time, the uncertainty of the election will be greatly increased.
Looking at the voter turnout, Iranian public opinion generally believes that the voter turnout in this election will have an important impact on the election results. A lower voter turnout will increase the likelihood of the conservatives winning, while a higher voter turnout will favor the reformist candidate Pezeshkian.
Some Iranian analysts have drawn a more accurate range: if the turnout is lower than 40%, Jalili has a high chance of winning, and may even win in the first round; if the turnout reaches 50%, Qalibaf's chances of winning will be greater; if the turnout reaches 60%, the reformist figure Pezeshkian is likely to win in the first round, without the need for a final runoff.
"There is indeed a saying in Iranian public opinion that voter turnout determines the outcome. The voter turnout reflects how many voters who support the reformists come out to vote." Qin Tian pointed out that, in general, the base of voters for Iran's conservatives and reformists has reached a population of more than 10 million, and the "swing" voter group is not particularly large. The conservative base is relatively fixed, mainly composed of grassroots people, revolutionary guard groups, religious groups, etc., and the voting stability is stronger. The base of the reformists may not be very stable, and it is easy to boycott the election. Therefore, a high voter turnout will be more beneficial to the reformists.
Over the past week, the Iranian presidential election has been heating up with five intensive TV debates. The six candidates showed off their talents on the stage, answering questions on economic, diplomatic, cultural and other topics, expounding on their respective policy plans, and criticizing their opponents, which constantly aroused the enthusiasm of the public to watch the debate.
Public opinion pointed out that throughout the five debates, the focus was mainly on hot issues such as getting the West to lift sanctions, promoting economic growth, and the "headscarf" policy. These issues are also the main challenges that the new Iranian president will face.
The two analysts sorted out the new Iranian president's next major tasks from both internal and external perspectives.
Liu Zhongmin pointed out that in recent years, Iran's economic situation has not improved significantly and has suffered from inflation many times. Behind this, Iran has long been subject to severe sanctions from the United States and the West, and its economic development faces huge obstacles. There are also some drawbacks in its political system and mechanism. Promoting economic growth is undoubtedly the top priority for the new Iranian president.
Externally, Liu Zhongmin believes that the challenges facing Iran's new president are at several different levels.
In terms of the surrounding areas, the Lehi government has achieved reconciliation and resumption of diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, which has greatly improved Iran's surrounding environment. However, in the context of the continuation and spread of the new round of Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as the "resistance axis" forces supported by Iran are more deeply involved in the conflict, the contradiction between Iran and Israel will be further intensified.
Regarding the US, the US-Iran confrontation is still the core of Iran's foreign policy. While confronting the US, the Lehi government also showed a pragmatic side. Before Lehi's death, representatives of Iran and the US were still conducting indirect negotiations in Oman, seeking a breakthrough in resuming negotiations on the Iran nuclear agreement. However, with the US election approaching in November and former President Trump's possible re-election, the US and Iran face a greater risk of confrontation.
In other aspects, during the Raihi administration, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS, actively strengthened cooperation with major powers outside the region such as China and Russia, and opened up a new situation for Iran's diplomacy. After the new president takes office, Iran's emphasis on developing Sino-Iranian relations and continuing to "look east" is not expected to change.
Qin Tian pointed out that no matter which candidate comes to power, they will face a series of similar challenges such as economic development, improvement of people's livelihood, and relations with the United States, but it is difficult to achieve significant changes in the short term. First, structural problems are difficult to reverse; second, the presidential power is restricted by the supreme leader and other power institutions, and the room for policy maneuvers after taking office is relatively limited.
