What is Türkiye planning to "reduce" Russia's "overweight" Western balance | NATO | Türkiye

Türkiye's diplomatic stance over the past few days is intriguing. It not only intends to weaken its balanced position in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, but also begins to move closer to Ukraine. It seems that Turkey has begun to repair its relations with the West and promote its foreign policy to move back to the west.

This judgment comes from two recent performances of Türkiye. First of all, on July 8, after visiting Türkiye, Ukrainian President Zelensky brought back five commanders of the "Yasu Battalion" protected by Türkiye. This obviously violates the agreement on prisoner exchange between Türkiye and Russia, not only does it not conform to Türkiye's neutral role in foreign propaganda for a long time, but also goes against Türkiye's basic position as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In the mediation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Türkiye's most proud diplomatic achievement is the successful mediation of Russia and Ukraine to sign and extend the Black Sea food agreement for several times, which has greatly eased the food difficulties of a number of Arab and African countries, greatly improved Türkiye's reputation in the Central and Northeast Africa region, and helped Erdogan win the election again.

However, since July, Russia has repeatedly refused to extend the Black Sea Food Agreement, insisting that all ships covered by the agreement can only leave the Black Sea before the expiration of the agreement on July 17th. This undoubtedly weakens Türkiye's role as mediator. Therefore, Türkiye's "big gift of letting go" to Zelensky, who visited Türkiye this time, is more like Turkey's gesture towards Russia, suggesting that "since Russia does not accept Turkey's mediation on the Black Sea Food Agreement, the Russia Ukraine prisoner exchange agreement previously signed by Turkey as an intermediary can also be abandoned".

Another signal that Türkiye's foreign policy has swung westward is that, at the NATO Vilnius Summit on July 12, Türkiye finally gave Sweden the green light to join NATO, even though Sweden only recently burned the Koran. It is obvious that Türkiye's choice to be friendly to the West at this time is conducive to its pursuit of more interests. In fact, after Türkiye relaxed Sweden's "accession" to the Treaty, the White House of the United States said it would continue to sell F-16 fighters to Türkiye through consultation with Congress. Moreover, Türkiye's position on Ukraine's "accession" to the Treaty has also undergone a major reversal. Erdogan publicly stated during the Vilnius Summit that Ukraine "should become a member of NATO". However, he also called on those countries with dual membership of NATO and the EU to open the way for Türkiye to join the EU. The President of the European Council immediately said that the EU would promote closer cooperation with Türkiye.

It is obviously impractical for Türkiye to gain the opportunity to join the EU by softening its position towards the West. However, as a NATO member, Türkiye's transformation itself has been quite symbolic. At the time when Ukraine's counteroffensive was frustrated, NATO's internal solidarity stance on issues related to Ukraine was crucial for Ukraine.

There are three main factors that have prompted Türkiye to make changes: first, short-term demands, which is a response to Russia's refusal to extend the Black Sea food agreement, hoping to use this to put pressure on it and urge it to make compromises; Second, it is a timely choice. Zelensky's visit to Türkiye and the NATO Summit provide an opportunity for Turkey to improve its relations with the West; The third is long-term consideration. The "protracted" war between Russia and Ukraine and the revitalization of Türkiye's economy need Western support.

If Erdogan had previously vigorously incited nationalism and demonstrated a tough stance towards the West in order to win re-election, then revitalizing the country's economy and fulfilling election promises after being elected is his top priority. The inflation level in Türkiye has remained high in recent years. It peaked at 85% in 2022 and is now close to 40%. In order to reverse this situation, since June this year, Erdogan has begun to adjust his non-traditional economic policy of continuously lowering interest rates to combat currency depreciation and high inflation. On June 22, Türkiye's central bank raised its benchmark interest rate by 650 basis points, from 8.5% to 15%. This is the first time that Türkiye has raised this key interest rate since the beginning of 2021. Western media interpreted this as Türkiye's economic policy began to "return to rationality".

In addition, Erdogan is also seeking breakthroughs in attracting foreign investment. According to the data of Türkiye's central bank in 2022, nearly 60% of Türkiye's foreign direct investment is from Europe, and the top two in terms of investment are the United Kingdom and the United States. Therefore, Türkiye has no reason or ability to continue to implement a tough foreign policy towards the West.

Whether it is in response to Russia's refusal to extend the Black Sea food agreement by releasing the commander of the "Asian Camp", or in exchange for the new chips of F-16 fighter planes and Türkiye's "accession to the EU" by Sweden's "accession to the Treaty", these "small moves" at the diplomatic level are just another example of Türkiye's pragmatic and opportunistic foreign policy. In the final analysis, the key reason for Türkiye's foreign policy to swing westward is to maximize Türkiye's own interests.

Although Türkiye has obvious signs of "reducing its holdings" in Russia and "overweight" Ukraine and Western groups, it is probably too early to conclude that Türkiye will choose sides in this protracted conflict and abandon its previous balance position. Türkiye's tourism industry largely depends on tourists from Russia. From January to February this year, more than 500000 Russians visited Türkiye, accounting for 13% of all foreign tourists received by Türkiye; In May this year, Russia allowed Türkiye to postpone the payment of its $4 billion natural gas bill to ease the pressure on Türkiye's currency reserves; Türkiye's first nuclear power plant, Akuyu Nuclear Power Plant, jointly built by the two countries, will also be put into operation this year... All these determine that Türkiye will not completely "turn against" Russia. The foreign policy makers in Ankara hold a precise interest calculator in their hands, and all variables are being precisely quantified. Their pragmatic and opportunistic nature is fully demonstrated in this foreign policy shift.