US media: The US chip blockade against China is an "act of war"
On July 13th, the New York Times website published an article titled "This is an Act of War: Decoding the US Chip Blockade Against China" by Alex Palmer. The full text is excerpted as follows:
Last October, the US Industrial and Security Administration released a declaration of war document equivalent to launching an economic war against China. The Bureau of Industry and Security is one of the 13 bureaus of the United States Department of Commerce, which employs approximately 350 agents and officials to jointly monitor trillions of dollars worth of transactions around the world.
During the most intense period of the Cold War, the Industrial and Security Bureau served as an important hub for Western defense, processing up to 100000 export licenses annually. After the Cold War, the Industrial and Security Bureau lost some of its reasons for existence, and the number of licenses decreased to approximately 10000 per year. Now, this number has reached 40000 and is constantly increasing.
In recent years, semiconductor chips have become the core of the work of the Industrial and Security Bureau.
On October 7th last year, the US government announced its intention to weaken China's ability to produce and even purchase the highest end chips through export controls. "The key here is to understand that the United States wants to influence China's artificial intelligence industry," said Gregory C. Allen of the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies. "The semiconductor industry is the means to achieve this goal."
Although the control measures on October 7th were implemented in a low-key form of updating export rules, they were essentially aimed at eradicating China's entire advanced technology ecosystem.
▲ Information image: This is a photo taken of the US Department of Commerce building in Washington, D.C. Shen Jizhong
Senior semiconductor analyst C.J. Muse said, "If you had told me these rules five years ago, I would have told you it was an act of war - we must be in a state of war."
If these control measures are successful, they may affect the progress of a generation in China; If failed, it could lead to astonishing counterproductive outcomes, and the future that the United States is striving to avoid will emerge even faster. This result may affect the competition between China and the United States in the coming decades, as well as the future of the global order.
By squeezing the natural bottlenecks in the industry, the Biden administration's goal is to prevent China from entering the future of chip technology. Its impact will go far beyond weakening China's military progress, and will also threaten China's economic growth and scientific leadership position. "We have said that China should not make progress in some key technological areas," said Emily Kirkreis, senior researcher at the New US Security Center and former US trade official. "And these areas happen to be the driving forces for future economic growth and development."
Behind China's strength lies a key weakness: almost all chips that power China's most advanced projects and institutions are inseparable from American technology.
The October 7th regulation represents a comprehensive understanding of semiconductor, supply chain, and US national strength issues among US policy makers. These measures have been declared as temporary final rules, meaning they will take immediate effect - a direct response to a weakness observed in controlling Huawei. "The Trump administration is targeting businesses," said Allen of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "The Biden administration is targeting the entire industry."
The decision to take unilateral action is a diplomatic gamble. Although the United States controls many key bottlenecks in the global semiconductor supply chain, other countries and regions also dominate equally critical sectors in the manufacturing process. If these countries and regions continue to sell products to China as before, the control measures on October 7th will be basically non-existent. But at the end of January, the Biden administration reached an agreement with Japan and the Netherlands to implement similar controls on semiconductors or semiconductor manufacturing equipment.
For China, the battle for technological autonomy may bring unprecedented challenges. Although the export controls on October 7th may have a significant impact on China's advanced chip manufacturing capabilities in the foreseeable future, they may ultimately stimulate its long-term growth.
These regulatory measures cannot once and for all contain China. Even in the most ideal scenario, they are just a delaying tactic aimed at providing space for the United States and its allies to expand their leading position in key technologies.
