The remarks of the Director of the US China Intelligence Agency's "China Intelligence Network": What intelligence is hidden beneath the "arrogant" appearance | country | appearance
On July 21, 2023, William Burns, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, made a statement during the Aspen Forum, which attracted high attention from international public opinion. In addition to the reply on whether Chinese Mainland will consider using force against Taiwan, Burns' statement that the CIA has made progress in rebuilding its human intelligence network with China has more political and news impact.
If Burns' statement that the CIA has made progress in rebuilding China's intelligence network is true, how will China's counterintelligence agencies respond? Based on the basic characteristics of US Soviet espionage during the Cold War and the legalization and transparency of China's anti espionage actions in recent years, we should fully trust the confidence and ability of the Chinese government to maintain national security on the basis of objective and rational analysis of Burns' arrogant remarks.
CIA Director's Rare Statement: What exactly does Burns want to express?
The current CIA Director Burns is a professional diplomat who has contributed most of his career to the US State Department, with his highest position being Assistant Secretary of State. The Director of the CIA is a political appointment, usually held by external officials rather than being promoted from within the CIA. As a diplomat, the main difference between Burns and the CIA agents he leads is that the former places more emphasis on how to handle relationships with the media. For example, Ms. Gina Hasper, the CIA director appointed by former President Trump, is a senior CIA agent who is extremely cautious in her public speaking.
Discussing foreign intelligence work, especially human intelligence work, in public is a taboo for professional agents. Burns' statement is very rare, but it is clearly not an oversight. Combining the occasion of the speech and the causes and consequences, at least a few issues have been confirmed.
Burns first answered the question about whether Chinese Mainland is determined to use force against Taiwan, and then explained human intelligence. He said, "Yes, we have made progress and in recent years we have worked very hard to ensure that we have strong human intelligence capabilities to supplement the intelligence we obtain through other methods."
In recent years, American politicians and academics have made judgments or predictions on such sensitive issues as whether and when Chinese Mainland will use force against Taiwan. 2027 is generally considered as a key node. The outside world believes that the CIA should have the most accurate intelligence. Burns emphasized the irreplaceable importance of human intelligence in answering the crucial question of whether to use force. As the director of the CIA, it is claimed that there may be another consideration for the progress made in rebuilding the China Human Intelligence Network, which is to strengthen the level of trust in the CIA's conclusions from the outside world.
Secondly, Burns responded to the news many years ago about the destruction of the Chinese intelligence network. The New York Times reported in May 2017 under the headline "The US spy network in China has been destroyed", stating that "since 2010, the CIA's spy network in China has been severely damaged. Human intelligence collection work is on the verge of paralysis." Burns' response objectively confirmed the New York Times report and also conveyed to the outside world that the CIA has recruited new spies.
US Intelligence Infiltration into China: Government wide, Domain wide, and Cognitive Warfare
In February 2022, the Biden administration released the official version of the National Security Strategy, defining China US relations as strategic competition and defining the next decade as a "critical decade.".
Against the backdrop of great power competition, the adversarial nature of China US relations has strengthened, and the effectiveness of strategic communication has weakened. From 2020 to the end of 2022, the epidemic has restricted the exchange of personnel between China and foreign countries, making it more difficult for the United States to penetrate intelligence into China. In 2023, with the resumption of personnel exchanges between China and foreign countries, human intelligence activities are bound to return to normal. The United States is more systematic in its intelligence penetration activities towards China, and non-human intelligence activities such as big data based intelligence collection and network theft are more rampant. With the support of AI technology development and Internet communication means, intelligence penetration activities reflect the operational characteristics of cognitive warfare.
The infiltration of intelligence into China by the United States presents a comprehensive and all government situation, and its strength may exceed that of the Cold War period.
The comprehensive integration of human intelligence and technical intelligence, as well as the integration of multiple means of network theft and infiltration, provides intelligence support for US decision-makers in strategic decision-making, military deployment adjustments, and secret infiltration operations. At present, the academic community has conducted sufficient research on the intelligence infiltration activities of the United States towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War by decrypting archives. As a reference, the decision-making of the Chinese leadership on major strategic issues, nuclear weapons, military deployments, and other strategic intelligence are undoubtedly the key points for the US intelligence agency to collect. Intelligence gathering against China is a key means for the United States to maintain its competitive advantage and expand its presence in China, and the CIA must establish its intelligence network in China. But with the resumption of personnel exchanges between China and the outside world, and the continuous strengthening of domestic anti espionage efforts, the author believes that the key nodes of this intelligence network may not be in China to avoid attacks from Chinese anti espionage agencies.
Looking back at the history of espionage warfare, the development of cutting-edge reconnaissance technology is often reflected in the field of technical intelligence. The US intelligence community has made public research results on big data intelligence, situational awareness systems, and higher precision spy reconnaissance satellites. Although the use of cutting-edge technology has enhanced the United States' technological reconnaissance and big data intelligence mining and analysis capabilities, human resources are indispensable for obtaining intelligence on certain key issues.
The entire government implements policies to contain China's technology and decouple the high-tech industry, and various departments of the US government have diversified demands for intelligence types. In the context of "the whole government facing China", the extension of intelligence has broken through the traditional definition of intelligence set by the intelligence community. Various government departments adopt diversified means to collect China's technology, economy, finance, and industrial intelligence, providing support for long-term jurisdictional measures such as export controls and economic and financial sanctions. For example, whether a Chinese company exports weapons to Russia, whether it transfers restricted parts and technology to physical listed companies, etc., the US Department of Commerce may use domestic institutions to conduct investigations and detections through commercial packaging.
Burns' statement can also be interpreted from the perspective of cognitive warfare. Burns is very clear about the consequences of this statement. If anti espionage resources are limited, conducting large-scale investigations according to Burns' statement will inevitably consume limited resources. In the current modern media environment where online communication dominates, cognitive warfare, as a form of intelligence warfare, deserves high vigilance. The main purpose of cognitive warfare is to shape the public's views on a certain issue and create a favorable public opinion environment for oneself.
Cognitive warfare blurs the boundary between real information and false information, leading the public to strengthen their understanding of a shaped trend. For example, the United States is increasingly hyping up the so-called "Chinese spy case". The mainstream media in the United States, such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNBC, and CNN, have thoroughly investigated the "Chinese spy case" and attempted to describe China as a spy warfare opponent that conducts comprehensive infiltration and penetration into the United States. In March 2023, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the United States released a report titled "Investigation of China's Spy Activities in the United States Since 2000", which sorted out over 200 so-called "Chinese spy cases" prosecuted by the Ministry of Justice. The report depicts a picture of the United States facing severe security challenges from "Chinese spies" through a numerical listing. And this picture provides a background narrative and moral legitimacy for the United States' own intelligence infiltration activities into China.
Great Power Confidence: China's increasingly mature and open anti espionage actions
Anti espionage work is a highly political and highly confidential task. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, China's anti espionage work has been either "doing more without saying" or "doing more but saying less", but this situation is quietly changing. As a country enters a new stage of development, decision-makers' consideration of national security will continue to rise. For any country, anti espionage work is a policy oriented and highly confidential task. The Chinese government regularly releases espionage cases, reflecting the increasing maturity and confidence of China's anti espionage actions in the context of great power competition.
Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the concept and means of maintaining national security by the Party Central Committee have undergone significant changes. With the rapid growth of comprehensive national strength, relevant departments of the Chinese government have continuously strengthened their means and capabilities to maintain national security. Relying on capacity building, China's anti espionage actions have been incorporated into the track of rule of law, and the display of anti espionage achievements is becoming increasingly transparent, reflecting maturity and confidence commensurate with competition with major powers.
As an important part of maintaining national security, anti espionage work is gradually becoming more legal and transparent.
In 2014, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress promulgated the Anti Espionage Law of the People's Republic of China; In 2017, the Implementation Rules of the Anti Espionage Law were promulgated; On July 1, 2023, the revised Anti Espionage Law will be implemented. Anti espionage work is fully integrated into the track of the rule of law. The legalization of anti espionage operations helps to further eliminate the so-called "gray zone". In certain technological and commercial fields, it is not uncommon for foreign spies or their agents to use commercial means such as due diligence to spy on confidential information. The new Anti Espionage Law conforms to the changes in the national security situation in the big data environment, further compressing the "gray zone" between legal and illegal activities. It is worth mentioning that foreign media criticizing the revision of the Anti Espionage Act for deteriorating the investment environment intentionally overlooked the recent expansion of the scope of application of the Foreign Agent Registration Act by US law enforcement agencies.
At the same time, the achievements of China's anti espionage operations frequently appear in public. Since the implementation of the "4.15" National Security Education and Propaganda Day, China has successively released a number of targeted and specific cases that endanger national security. For example, the Lee Henry case announced on April 15, 2021 directly targeted Western anti China forces led by the United States for interfering in Hong Kong affairs; On October 31st, the Ministry of National Security announced three cases that endangered the security of important data, profoundly demonstrating the severe situation faced by national security in the big data environment. The Zhao Xuejun spy case, announced on April 15, 2023, clearly explained the location and methods of being recruited by overseas spy agencies. It is a typical case of important personnel in the technology field being instigated and recruited. The Han Xiao case, which was announced at the same time, is a typical case of foreign spy agencies soliciting and plotting against grassroots civil servants. On May 16, 2023, the Chinese government disclosed the spy case of American citizen Liang Chengyun.
The normalized disclosure of the results of anti espionage operations first reflects the normalization of the gains of anti espionage operations. Behind the normalization of achievement harvest lies the normalization of clue discovery and case filing. Readers can evaluate whether the personnel and technical support behind it are in place.
Secondly, the public disclosure of the results of anti espionage operations helps to form a barrier for the whole society to resist espionage. The disclosure of espionage cases can not only deter spies who are still hiding in the dark, but also educate the public to establish national security awareness and strengthen the people's defense line against espionage. The establishment of 12339 provides a convenient and effective way for ordinary people to report suspicious individuals around them.
The espionage case is highly political and involves multiple departments such as diplomacy and national security, requiring coordination at the top level. Therefore, the changes in China's handling of anti espionage cases reflect a shift in top-level design thinking, which places greater emphasis on leveraging the political leverage effect of anti espionage work in the strategic context and critical stages of great power competition, deterring domestic criminals who attempt to sell national interests and try the law, while educating the public, building a strong people's defense line against espionage, and demonstrating the determination and will of the Chinese government to maintain national security.
