The relevant person in charge of the State Council Accident Investigation Team answered questions from reporters regarding the investigation of the "11.21" special major fire accident at Kaixinda Trading Co., Ltd. in Anyang, Henan Province
Recently, the Executive Meeting of the State Council approved the investigation report on the "11.21" special major fire accident of Kaixinda Trading Co., Ltd. in Anyang, Henan Province. The reporter interviewed the relevant person in charge of the accident investigation team regarding the hot issues of social concern in the accident.
Answer: After the accident, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council attach great importance to it. According to relevant laws and regulations, and with the approval of the State Council, a special investigation team for the "11.21" major fire accident of Kaixinda Trading Co., Ltd. in Anyang City, Henan Province was established, led by the Ministry of Emergency Management, with the participation of relevant officials from the Ministry of Public Security, the National Fire Rescue Bureau, the All China Federation of Trade Unions, and the People's Government of Henan Province. Experts were hired to participate in the accident investigation.
The accident investigation team, with an attitude of being responsible to the Party and the people, society and history, and adhering to the principles of "scientific rigor, legal compliance, seeking truth from facts, and emphasizing practical results", reviewed more than 1800 volumes of documents and materials, conducted 15 on-site investigations, and had 232 inquiries and conversations through on-site inspections, testing and appraisal, video analysis, simulation experiments, and data retrieval, questioning and discussions. The team investigated the accident process, causes, casualties, direct economic losses, and the situation of relevant units. The team identified the problems and responsibilities of local party committees, governments, relevant departments, and units in terms of supervision, and put forward suggestions for rectification and prevention measures.
The investigation determined that this is a production safety responsibility accident caused by serious violations of laws and regulations by the enterprise leader, failure to implement the main responsibility, and inadequate performance of local party committees, governments, and relevant departments and units.
Answer: The accident investigation team made comprehensive investigation and inquiry, on-site inspection, video analysis, experimental verification and technical appraisal, excluded factors such as arson, electricity, spontaneous combustion and smoking, and identified the direct cause of the accident: the person in charge of Cassida Corporation conducted illegal welding operations in the warehouse on the first floor. High temperature welding slag ignited the packaging carton, and the bottled polyurethane foam caulking agent in the carton exploded and ignited when heated, thus causing a large amount of butter, self spray paint, rust remover, bottled butane and gloves for the card furnace, rubber products, etc. to burn and spread rapidly one after another, and generating a large amount of high-temperature toxic smoke. When a fire broke out, some of the fire-fighting facilities in the first floor warehouse of Kaixinda Company were missing, and the second floor was artificially shut down and failed. The responsible person of Shangxin Company did not organize the evacuation of employees in a timely and effective manner, which was an important cause of a large number of employee casualties.
There are five main reasons for this accident: firstly, unlicensed illegal and irregular welding operations. The relevant person in charge of Kaixinda Company has repeatedly engaged in illegal and irregular welding operations without obtaining a special operation certificate; In the afternoon of the day when the incident occurred, the warehouse was entered and the shelves were welded in violation of regulations. The welding slag ignited the packaging carton with bottled polyurethane foam caulking agent at the lower end of the shelves, causing a fire. The second issue is the lack or failure of some fire-fighting facilities inside the building. When the building on fire was originally designed as an exhibition hall, Kaixinda Company did not set up a fire control room according to the design requirements. Later, it changed the first floor to a warehouse without installing an automatic fire alarm system and automatic sprinkler system, resulting in the inability to achieve early alarm and automatic sprinkler control of the fire in the early stages of the fire. The above-mentioned fire-fighting facilities on the second floor where Shangxin Company is located were artificially shut down and failed, resulting in the company's employees not being informed of the fire alarm prompt and evacuating in a timely manner. Thirdly, a large number of dangerous and flammable materials burn and spread quickly, with high temperature and high toxicity. The warehouse of Kexinda Company has stored nearly 5 tons of lubricating butter, more than 196000 pairs of gloves, more than 14000 bottles of polyurethane foam sealant, more than 25000 bottles of self spray paint, more than 12000 bottles of bottled butane for cassette furnaces, etc. It only took 3 minutes from the appearance of an open flame in the warehouse to the sealing of the indoor stairs of Shangxin Company with thick smoke. The highest temperature of the fire exceeded 1400 degrees Celsius, and the combustion generated a large amount of high-temperature toxic smoke, exacerbating the fire risk. Fourthly, illegal separation increases security risks. Kaixinda Company randomly separated and rented out the building on fire, and did not follow the standard requirements for fire separation. Especially, the connection between the internal staircase leading to the outdoor area and Kaixinda Company's warehouse was only sealed with cardboard boxes. This caused a large amount of high-temperature toxic smoke to quickly break through the cardboard boxes after the warehouse caught fire, filling the internal staircase and blocking the escape route for Shangxin Company employees. Fifth, the evacuation was not organized in a timely and effective manner. In the early stages of the fire, the main person in charge of Shangxin Company received a report and did not organize the evacuation of employees in a timely manner, missing the best opportunity for evacuation. The person in charge escaped on their own through the familiar outdoor staircase. However, the trapped employee of the company, who had not been trained and did not know how to escape through the outdoor staircase, pried open the partition iron sheet and entered the neighboring garment factory. Unfortunately, they were trapped in thick smoke and died.
Answer: The accident investigation team has identified the main problems that exist in the involved enterprises, local party committees, governments, and relevant departments through investigation.
Mainly including the following aspects: firstly, the involved enterprises seriously violate laws and regulations and fail to fulfill their main responsibilities. Kaixinda Company failed to obtain land use rights in accordance with regulations, and failed to handle procedures such as construction land planning permit, construction project planning permit, construction project construction permit, construction project completion acceptance, and fire protection design review acceptance filing in accordance with regulations; The first floor warehouse is not equipped with an automatic fire alarm system and automatic sprinkler fire extinguishing system, and a single-layer iron sheet is illegally used to separate it from the workshop inside the building; Renting illegal buildings to other production and operation units, failing to regularly conduct safety inspections and supervise the rectification of hidden dangers on the lessee; The renovation of fire protection facilities shall be handed over to unqualified entities for construction; The company leader engaged in unauthorized welding operations without a certificate. After setting up functional rooms such as offices, conference rooms, and exhibition halls in the workplace, Shangxin Company found that the distance between the entrance of the passageway and the indoor staircase did not meet the regulatory requirements, seriously affecting the safe evacuation of trapped personnel; Failure to implement a fire safety responsibility system, failure to establish a fire safety system for the unit, and failure to organize pre job safety education and training for employees; Failure to develop emergency rescue and evacuation plans, and failure to organize drills; Failure to effectively organize safe evacuation, resulting in significant casualties. The second issue is that local party committees and governments have not conscientiously implemented their responsibilities for local safety management.In the 12 years from entering the park and building factories in 2010 to renting them out separately until the incident occurred, the involved enterprises did not have any required land, planning, construction permits, and did not apply for fire design review and acceptance filing, but were able to operate as usual. Thirdly, the supervision, inspection, and special rectification of fire rescue institutions are inadequate. The law enforcement inspection was not strict or detailed. In February 2019, when the Public Security Fire Brigade of Yuanfeng District conducted a fire supervision inspection on the two garment factories on the second floor of the building that caught fire, they did not inspect the basic issues such as the failure to complete the fire acceptance registration procedures and the non-compliance of indoor evacuation channels. In May and June, they conducted re inspections, but did not conduct spot checks on the warehouse of Kaixinda Company on the first floor, and did not find or dispose of some missing fire protection facilities. The special rectification is not thorough or in-depth, and units such as Kaixinda Company and Shangxin Company have not been included in the "double random, one open" unit list. In the three-year action plan for fire safety special rectification, no fire supervision and inspection have been conducted on the above-mentioned units. Failure to inspect and discover the problem of unlicensed welding operations by the person in charge of Kaixinda Company in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Fire Protection Law. The fourth issue is that the commercial department lacks guidance and supervision on fire safety management in the commercial industry. From June to August 2020, the third level commerce departments in Henan Province issued the "Three Year Action Plan for Fire Safety Special Rectification", requiring a comprehensive investigation of fire safety risks and hidden dangers in the commercial industry. The business departments of Anyang City and Wenfeng District have never conducted hidden danger investigations on Kaixinda Company, and have
Answer: This accident has exposed many prominent problems and weak links in the local fire safety work. In order to draw lessons from others, raise the alarm, and deepen safety prevention work, the accident investigation team has proposed five suggestions for rectification and prevention measures:
The second is to comprehensively weave and strengthen the fire safety responsibility network, refine the responsibility measures of relevant departments, resolutely eliminate blind spots and loopholes in fire safety supervision, inspection and management of small and medium-sized enterprises, and prevent responsibility from hanging in the air. Thirdly, we will deepen the governance of prominent fire safety issues in small and medium-sized enterprises. We need to comprehensively investigate and accelerate the resolution of safety issues caused by the "getting on the bus first and then buying tickets" policy in industrial park enterprises. We will urge all types of enterprises to handle fire administrative approval procedures in accordance with the law, draw lessons from others, carry out special fire safety governance, and strengthen the spot check and inspection of fire safety facilities in labor-intensive enterprises. The fourth is to improve and perfect relevant laws and regulations, accelerate the improvement of laws and regulations that are in line with the Fire Protection Law, and promptly formulate and revise the implementation methods of the fire safety responsibility system, fire safety management regulations, fire supervision and inspection regulations, etc. The fifth is to effectively strengthen the grassroots safety governance capacity, reform and improve the grassroots fire safety supervision system and mechanism, strengthen the professional fire safety forces at the grassroots level, and fill the gaps in grassroots fire safety.
