Ring the alarm for grassroots cadres!, The Four Issues Reported by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection | Corruption | The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
On June 7th, the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection released four cases of corruption around the public, including illegal embezzlement of funds and bonus payments, illegal profit-making for family and friends, and embezzlement of public funds.
These four cases of "micro corruption" have a relatively mild degree and a small impact, but their manifestations and subjects are diverse, as pointed out in the notice:
From April to November 2019, Pan Chenggang, former party branch secretary of Jianhe Jiayuan residential area in Beixinjing Street, Changning District, Shanghai, and He Xiaoying, former director of the neighborhood committee, decided to participate in the embezzlement of more than 20000 yuan from the neighborhood committee's related funds for the illegal distribution of bonuses.
In February 2019, Xu Jianzhong, former intern deputy general manager of Baoshan Grain and Oil Company and former party branch secretary and manager of Shanghai Baoliang Military Grain Supply Station, rented out the houses and premises of Baoshan Grain and Oil Company Gucun Branch to a company controlled by his relatives. The company then subleased the premises to other companies, profiting more than 500000 yuan from it.
From April 2020 to December 2021, Huang Xiuping, former party branch secretary and village committee director of Caiyuan Village in Baozhen, Chongming District, Shanghai, embezzled labor costs and other expenses by inflating them, totaling more than 10000 yuan. She also secretly shared the funds for the investigation of rural houses with former deputy party branch secretary Wang Chunyuan, former deputy director of the village committee Shen Qin, and others.
As the saying goes, "A thousand mile embankment collapses at an ant colony.". "Micro corruption" is no different from other types of corruption. Compared to "tigers", "flies" may be small, but they will directly harm the visible interests of the people and seriously damage the image of the Party and government in the hearts of the people.
Why is it easy for grassroots to breed "micro corruption"? How to make grassroots misconduct nowhere to hide? Let's take a look together.
What are the characteristics of "micro corruption"? What are the high-risk areas?
The phenomenon of "micro corruption" involves various fields in social production and life, showing characteristics such as "small", "many", and vague public attitudes towards it.
In terms of frequency of occurrence, the phenomenon of "micro corruption" is common in mass autonomous organizations, units with public resources, and grassroots government agencies in townships that hold administrative power.
Firstly, it is grassroots mass autonomous organizations. Village committees and resident committees are grassroots mass autonomous organizations for self-management, self-education, and self-service of villagers in China, implementing democratic elections, decision-making, management, and supervision. The phenomenon of "micro corruption" is not only prevalent in village committees, but also common in resident committees. Micro corruption in rural areas is more common in grassroots autonomous organizations, where public officials use their power to seek personal gain for themselves or others.
China's rural areas are a typical society based on human relationships, face saving, and relationships. The staff of grassroots mass autonomous organizations in rural areas are not only the "agents" of township party and government agencies in rural areas, but also representatives elected by villagers. At the same time, the village committee also holds collective property and plays an important role in subsidy distribution, subsistence allowance handling, housing demolition, and land acquisition. In addition to implementing specific tasks, it also has to assume regulatory functions. Once the members of the village committee are unable to effectively regulate their own behavior and use their power for personal gain, the village committee will become a private tool for a few people to seek benefits.
China's rural areas are prone to forming a "hierarchical pattern" based on blood and geographical factors, with themselves as the center, forming a complex social network, providing a soil for good family and friends, soliciting bribes and accepting bribes. The true portrayal of some rural areas is that "having someone at home is easy to handle" and "one person gets the way, chickens and dogs ascend to heaven". These unhealthy practices have not been abandoned with social progress, but have become "prevalent" in some places.
Compared to rural areas, the phenomenon of "micro corruption" at the urban community level cannot be ignored. Urban "micro corruption" mainly exists in specific areas such as housing demolition, infrastructure renovation and upgrading, and public service guarantee.
For example, in the field of housing demolition, with the advancement of urbanization and shantytown renovation projects, community residents committees have played an important role in assisting relevant government departments in carrying out demolition subsidies. Due to having a strong command of language in various specific tasks, some community resident committees have become the main carriers of seeking personal gain through their power. More importantly, "group corruption" has become an important manifestation of "micro corruption". Due to work relationships, relevant personnel are prone to forming a chain of common interests, leading to corrupt "group warfare".
Secondly, there are units with public resources. The possibility of "micro corruption" in units that control the allocation of social public resources is also relatively high, mainly due to their exclusive power in resource allocation, such as mining, forestry, soil and water, as well as in areas such as medical, health, and other livelihood sectors, which are prone to becoming breeding grounds for "micro corruption". The phenomenon of "micro corruption" in the field of people's livelihood has become a major disaster area for corruption outbreaks, and has not yet been effectively eradicated. Although the "micro corruption" that occurs in areas such as agricultural funds, new rural construction, education and healthcare, and ecological environment protection involves a small amount of money, it directly infringes on the vital interests of the general public.
The "micro corruption" in the field of people's livelihood mainly refers to the "small greed and corruption" of "wild geese crossing and pulling hair", and its manifestations are also diverse.
One is that a small number of public officials illegally ride the "free riding" of special appropriations and illegally deceive people into obtaining "cheese" for their livelihood. In recent years, the whole country and various regions have invested a large amount of funds in the field of people's livelihood, and have achieved significant results in multiple fields. However, some cadres, due to their weak awareness of party discipline, national law, and insufficient motivation for public service, are accustomed to taking advantage of their positions to ride the "ride" of people's livelihood construction, such as fabricating relevant information and materials for personal gain for themselves and their relatives and friends, and using special funds allocated by higher-level departments without authorization.
The second is that some public officials take advantage of their positions to misappropriate livelihood funds and "borrow chicken to lay eggs". For example, in some regions, there has been a phenomenon of public officials misappropriating urban and rural resident pension insurance funds without authorization. Urban and rural resident pension insurance is a guarantee for the vast majority of the people to enjoy their later years. Once it is misappropriated or embezzled, it will directly affect the normal operation of the urban and rural resident pension insurance fund and easily trigger major social security risks. The misappropriation of significant funds often starts with "micro corruption" in the early stages of corruption, but long-term "micro corruption" is not detected and investigated, which can easily shake the party spirit of public officials and lay the groundwork for big corruption.
Thirdly, there are problems in the construction of the work style of some public officials. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the effectiveness of combating the "Four Winds" has been significant, and the hedonism and extravagance at the grassroots level have been effectively curbed. However, there are still some new problems, such as learning about people's livelihoods from village and community cadres, replacing personally going deep into the grassroots to understand the situation at the grassroots level; The interpretation and implementation of livelihood policies are hasty, disregarding whether the policies are effectively implemented; In major areas of people's livelihood, it is customary to use formalistic "show off" to replace down-to-earth "hard work", and so on.
Finally, it is the grassroots township government that holds administrative power. Township grassroots organizations are the peripheral branches of administrative power in China, bearing a large amount of responsibility but possessing relatively limited power. With the release of the Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China, the reform of China's supervision system has entered a new stage. However, the Supervision Law only requires the establishment of supervision committees at the provincial, municipal, and county levels in China, and there is no clear requirement for the township level.
In reality, some grassroots organizations in townships have been in a state of weakened or even blank supervision for a long time, leading to them becoming a high-risk breeding ground for "micro corruption". Although township discipline inspection commission cadres, as an important force in combating corruption, bear the responsibility of supervision, they are often constrained by some factors and find it difficult to effectively carry out their work, especially when it comes to the relatively small impact of "micro corruption", which often cannot be given sufficient attention; However, the motivation and ability of the majority of villagers to participate in supervising township institutions are often insufficient, and various factors have led to grassroots township organs, especially key positions in townships, becoming a high-risk area for "micro corruption".
In reality, the "micro corruption" of grassroots government agencies in townships is mainly manifested in taking bribes, being cold and forceful, being lazy and lax, forming cliques, and being friendly and friendly. A thousand mile embankment collapses at an ant colony. A person's corruption and deterioration all start with "minor" living problems, food and drink problems, and other related issues that violate the spirit of the central eight point regulations. If there is a lack of effective governance over micro corruption in grassroots township organs, it will not only seriously affect the fundamental interests of the people, but also shake the foundation of the Party's long-term governance.
2. Which cadres are prone to being involved in "micro corruption"?
In order to effectively address the issue of corruption, the Party and the state have carried out various forms of special rectification work, aiming to fundamentally curb corrupt behavior. Compared to others, the direct harm of "micro corruption" is relatively small, but it involves a wide range of subjects. From the perspective of the frequency of "micro corruption", frontline public officials who have direct contact with the general public are prone to become the main body of "micro corruption", usually including members of the village committee; Staff who have access to public resources; Grassroots administrative staff, etc.
Firstly, members of the village committee. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the anti-corruption campaign of "catching tigers and catching flies" has achieved significant results, among which corruption among village committee cadres has become a major disaster area of "catching flies" style anti-corruption. Due to the ideological and moral decline, some village committee cadres have a series of problems such as seeking personal gain through power, coercion and inducement, poor work style, corruption and bribery, which have led to the abuse of power. "Small officials and huge corruption" has become an important governance problem that is difficult to avoid in the process of rural revitalization.
The dual identity of village committee cadres as "agents" has led them to become susceptible to "micro corruption". On the one hand, they are elected by villagers through democratic elections and exercise management rights on behalf of villagers. On the other hand, they are also the agents of higher-level administrative agencies in rural areas, which are products of administrative power infiltration and grassroots social management. This identity can easily lead to weakened supervision from top to bottom and weak supervision from bottom to top. In addition, the concentration of power among members of the village committee can easily trigger the risk of corruption.
Secondly, staff who have access to public resources. Staff who control and participate in the allocation of public resources are easily tempted by self-interest and engage in "micro corruption" behavior, while long-term "micro corruption" can easily lead to "petty officials and huge corruption".
In many fields such as new rural construction, basic education, medical and health care, agricultural policies, social security, infrastructure renovation and upgrading, and rural revitalization, some leading cadres and staff, when it comes to fund allocation and resource allocation, use various forms of "micro corruption" such as favoritism, overcharging, illegal charging, and card taking to seize benefits.
For example, in the issue of housing, some local leaders and cadres rent out public rental housing to friends and family for free or at a low price by following the principle of "favoritism"; Some state-owned enterprises and institutions do not lawfully turn over the rental amount of public housing to the national treasury, but instead deposit it into their private "small treasury" for flexible disposal.
Thirdly, grassroots administrative staff. Unlike the staff of the village committees mentioned above, personnel of grassroots administrative organs are included in the national administrative establishment, have control over national administrative power, and are responsible for economic and social development work within their jurisdiction. Some regions overly focus on economic growth and downplay the construction of party conduct and clean governance, resulting in weak party spirit among some grassroots public officials. Once grassroots administrative staff become accustomed to the phenomenon of "micro corruption" and lack vigilance, they are susceptible to the invasion of the corruption epidemic. Over time, those party members and cadres with weak willpower will gradually transform from "micro corruption" to "huge corruption" and spread it widely, causing a serious and bad social atmosphere.
Compared to the corruption of the "big tigers", the "micro corruption" of grassroots administrative staff often appears "insignificant" due to the small amount involved and the small surface harm. However, these "micro corruption" behaviors occur at the grassroots front line closest to the people, which are most directly felt and deeply despised by the people. This will lead to a decrease in people's trust in the government, damage the relationship between the cadres and the masses, and in the long run, it will shake the foundation of the Party's governance.
3. The causes and governance of "micro corruption"
General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "We must conscientiously correct and seriously investigate and deal with issues such as grassroots corruption and unfair law enforcement, safeguard the vital interests of the masses, and let the masses feel more of the actual results of fighting corruption and advocating integrity." Compared with the "tiger", although the "fly" is small, it will directly damage the "visible" interests of the people and seriously damage the image of the party and the government in the hearts of the people.
At its root, the phenomenon of "micro corruption" is caused by systemic problems, which are not only related to individual factors of public officials, but also to the environmental factors they are in. Overall, there are the following points:
One is the decline in moral literacy. Some local governments place too much emphasis on economic and social development, neglecting the ideological and moral education of public officials, leading to a lack of faith in some public officials, a decline in moral literacy, and a proliferation of materialism and hedonism. Even some leading cadres mistakenly believe that emphasizing too much on the construction of party conduct and clean governance will dampen the work enthusiasm of public officials, and affect their freedom to work and start businesses.
For example, in some rural grassroots organizations, rural cadres are responsible for specific business responsibilities and are busy with work. In addition, the imperfect mechanism for building a clean and honest government has led to a prominent phenomenon of neglecting education and management in party conduct and clean government education. In the long run, due to the decline in ideological and moral literacy, coupled with insufficient party spirit cultivation and spiritual "calcium deficiency", these public officials are prone to losing their resistance when faced with various temptations of interests. In addition, they are influenced by some negative social customs, especially the relatively small "micro corruption" that they feel "indifferent", and even take it for granted. They may hold the erroneous idea that "micro corruption" behavior does not need to be "listed on the agenda", and even hold a lucky mentality of not being held accountable to the public.
Secondly, there is a lack of power supervision. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Party and the state have continuously tightened the iron cage that prohibits corruption, effectively curbing the vast majority of corrupt behavior. Micro corruption is mainly manifested as an imbalance in power allocation. The power allocation of some grassroots party and government leaders shows a situation of insufficient legal power and centralized self delegated power. Due to the relatively small amount of statutory power granted by superiors, the leader may find it difficult to effectively solve problems in complex grassroots social affairs. At this point, the "leader" expands their discretion to complete the task of grassroots social governance, thereby achieving performance goals. Although it can be seen from the results that this "self delegation of power concentration" can effectively improve administrative efficiency to a certain extent, it can easily lead to excessive concentration of power by the "top leaders", resulting in a situation of overall monopoly, and at this time, "micro corruption" is prone to occur.
The third is the weakening of positive incentive mechanisms. Salary incentives are one of the important ways to motivate public sector employees. For a long time, the salary level and growth rate of civil servants in China have been relatively low, lagging behind the economic growth rate, and the grassroots civil servant group has become particularly prominent. In addition, the income of the leadership team of the village committees outside the fiscal budget mainly relies on the support of the originally tight budget townships, and some cadres need to undertake heavy grassroots work, which often leads to the dilemma of low income and heavy tasks for village committee cadres. The weakening of positive incentive mechanisms has become an excuse for individual public officials to engage in micro corruption.
The fourth is that the legal punishment is not strict. The Party and the state have repeatedly emphasized the "great harm" of "micro corruption", but from a legal perspective, existing laws and regulations are difficult to effectively punish "micro corruption". Due to the lack of clear explanation of the specific amount involved in "micro corruption" in party and government discipline, the identification of "micro corruption" behavior lacks standards and is difficult to effectively govern.
According to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, if taking advantage of one's position to illegally occupy public property, misappropriate public funds, demand property from others, or illegally accept property from others constitutes a crime, the crimes of embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds, and bribery shall apply. The Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Corruption and Bribery has adjusted the starting point of the crime of embezzlement of public funds to 30000 yuan. That is to say, it is difficult to punish some "micro corruption" behaviors with a limit of less than 30000 yuan within the scope of criminal law.
Overall, the current anti-corruption laws and regulations in China are a measure of pre deterrence and post punishment. In terms of the identification and supervision of "micro corruption", relevant laws and regulations are not clearly defined and lack guidance, making it easy for "micro corruption" to occur, which is not conducive to the effective governance of "micro corruption".
Whether or not "micro corruption" can be eliminated is related to the clean and upright political ecology at the grassroots level. We must further increase the efforts to rectify "micro corruption", focus on early detection and punishment, and form a deterrent effect. We need to improve various systems, standardize the operation of small and micro power, strengthen supervision, discipline and accountability, and prevent "micro corruption" from the source. At the same time, we will strengthen integrity education, deepen the awareness of discipline and rules in people's hearts, and enable party members and cadres to rectify their ideological roots and cultivate their talents.
